Kurdistan:  The Taiwan of the Middle East? by Chiu, Yvonne
GLOBAL SOCIETY
Kurdistan: The Taiwan of the Middle East?
Yvonne Chiu1
Published online: 13 June 2018
# Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, part of Springer Nature 2018
Abstract
Taiwan and Kurdistan appear to have little in common, but the progressive values of these two societies embedded within hostile
regions make them both natural allies and important strategic assets in the U.S.’s and international community’s long-term fight
against authoritarianism and radical religious theocracies. Instead, they have been ignored and/or exploited in the pursuit of short-
term geopolitical and economic interests in the Asia-Pacific and Middle East regions, which comes at great cost to American and
international values as well as long-term strategic interests, so both citizens and policymakers must consider new approaches.
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Over the past half century, what is now nine American admin-
istrations have faced intractable geopolitical conflicts in which
they appeased dominant regional powers at the expense of
smaller ones more aligned with progressive values and inter-
national norms. The same trade-off is made in radically dif-
ferent regions. In East Asia, Taiwan—a thriving liberal de-
mocracy—is sidelined, while in the Middle East, the
Kurdish people, who form a progressive Muslim society, lack
any feasible path toward independent statehood. Despite their
differences, recognizing the structural similarities between
Taiwan and Kurdistan allows for both citizens and
policymakers to hold more comprehensive policy debates
about these situations.
In both cases, American cultivation of immediate geopolit-
ical and economic goals has come at great cost to its own
values as well as its own long-term strategic interests.
Intellectuals and policymakers justify this by imagining that
the powers they favored (e.g., China, Saudi Arabia) could be
managed according to American ambitions and would be-
come more moderate with time, engagement, and rising in-
comes; that has not been the case, and it is foolhardy to believe
that moderation might still transpire this way.
These false narratives about the dominant regional
powers harm the entire international community, although
that is partly well-intentioned. In the face of geopolitical
uncertainty, Western politicians, academics, and intelli-
gentsia search for familiar interlocutors among unfamiliar
adversaries, in particular for a liberal democratic
Confucianism and a moderate Islam, but they have fo-
cused their attention in the wrong places, much to their
own detriment.
The Quest for a Liberal Democratic
Confucianism
To the East, people scour China’s landscape for signs of influ-
ence from traditional philosophies such as Confucianism and
classical Chinese military ethics, which are perceived as rule-
abiding, moral, and meritocratic. They hope it will shed light
on contemporary Chinese thinking, and that the moral recti-
tude emphasized therein indicates that China and its military
will respect the rule of law, human rights, civil liberties, and
international law.
That optimism is, unfortunately, misguided. Historical
Chinese thought actually reveals little about its contem-
porary counterpart, because the major Chinese cultural
traditions (both thoughts and practices) were thoroughly
purged by the Communist Party over the past seventy
years, through a series of horrific upheavals and man-
made tragedies.
Some scholars are developing contemporary Chinese po-
litical and military ethics by drawing from and reconstituting
traditional schools of thought, but these philosophies are not
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significant in contemporary Chinese society or People’s
Liberation Army (PLA) military ethics, as is frequently be-
lieved. This misunderstanding is encouraged by the CCP it-
self: it erected (then removed) Confucius’s statue in
Tiananmen Square, and touts its BConfucian^ study groups,
its carefully-named Confucius Institutes across the world, and
the teaching of the SevenMilitary Classics at its military acad-
emies. Observers usually take this at face value and believe
that this means ordinary Chinese people are re-integrating
Confucianism into their lives.
What they and even Chinese people themselves miss
is that the BConfucian revival^ is more apparent than
real, as most Chinese readers can access only censored
excerpts of Confucius’s writings or approved interpreta-
tions that emphasize obedience and filial piety (to the
Party) and omit the passages about governors’ duties to
rule sagely and serve the interests of the people. (Most
observers and Chinese alike also seem to forget the
richness and variety of Chinese political thought beyond
Confucianism, including Mohism, Daoism, Legalism,
and Buddhism, among others.) This state-sanctioned
BConfucianism^ is stripped of its complexity, substitut-
ing instead simplistic conceptions of hierarchy that suit
the Party’s purposes. In reality, it is authoritarianism
masquerading under the recognizable brand of
Confucius’ name.
Furthermore, the CCP itself is simultaneously forth-
coming on these matters. The PLA’s contemporary writ-
ings on military ethics focus primarily on the ethical
imperative of self- sacrifice for Party and country, rather
than the urgency of the ruler’s own moral uprightness in
waging war (as discussed throughout the Seven Military
Classics) or the principles of civilian immunity, POW
protections, and other widely-accepted tenets of the
Geneva Conventions on the laws of war. China alter-
nately advocates economic development and growth as
paramount human rights and scolds the rest of the
world that what happens in China is none of their busi-
ness and that they should look to their own sins.
Alongside talk of a Bharmonious^ society and Bpeaceful
rise,^ sanctioned Chinese political thought presents war
as Bnot only a military struggle, but also a comprehen-
sive contest on fronts of politics, economy, diplomacy,
and law,^ and considers international law Ba powerful
weapon to expose the enemy and win over sympathy
and support of the international community and strive
to gain the position of strategic initiative.^
China’s own statements combined with its ongoing aggres-
siveness in the Asia-Pacific region—including the East and
South China Seas, where China’s territorial expansion through
building artificial islands is unsettling the region—demon-
strate that what the international community seeks is not to
be found there.
The Taiwan Model
Most of all, the international community willfully overlooks
that everything it is searching for already exists—convenient-
ly—right across the strait. Taiwan’s modern society is deeply-
influenced by traditional Chinese values, and is now nearly
unrecognizable from its authoritarian days, having non-
violently transformed from an oppressive dictatorship (that
ruled with martial law until 1987) to a successful liberal de-
mocracy. Is that democracy sometimes messy, raucous, petty,
and corrupt? Absolutely. But it is also vibrant, diverse, com-
plex, open, stable, and, most importantly, willing to confront
its difficult past and inevitable present shortcomings, as only
sincere liberal democracies do. More so than any other coun-
try in Asia, Taiwan has attempted to rectify past injustices
against indigenous groups, for example, and its high court
has boldly paved the way for the legalization of gay marriage,
which would make it the vanguard in Asia. All this is a re-
markable achievement in less than three decades.
China’s rapid modernization notwithstanding, the CCP’s
chosen path is decidedly illiberal and oppressive. Modernity
alone cannot induce freedom, autonomy, and protections of
basic rights and liberties, as the lessons of twentieth-century
totalitarianism have already shown. Despite its stunning eco-
nomic growth in the recent decades, China shows no signs of
establishing genuine rule of law, separation of powers, consti-
tutionalism, an independent judiciary, and essential rights pro-
tections—all of which already exist in Taiwan.
Yet, the international community is only too eager to go
along with China’s Bone-China^ policy and its designation of
Taiwan as a renegade province; as of this writing, all states
save seventeen (plus the Vatican) refuse to recognize Taiwan
as a country. Multiple American administrations have held
Taiwan out as a bargaining chip in an effort to appease
China, most recently the Trump administration on the heels
of a controversial phone call fromTaiwan’s president Tsai Ing-
wen to the newly-elected American president that would have
been utterly unremarkable between any two other countries.
The international community excuses this diplomatic pur-
gatory by pointing to Taiwan’s Bde facto^ or Beffective^ inde-
pendence—but it is not independence if it exists only at the
will and whim of a more powerful actor and can be revoked at
any time without recourse. Some cite surveys in which a ma-
jority of Taiwanese favor the status quo of international limbo
over reunification or declaring independence, but these sur-
veys fail to ask about the impact on their preferences of
China’s direct and frequent threats, regular interference in
Taiwanese elections, and roughly 1500 missiles aimed at
Taiwan at all times. (More comprehensive surveys show that
a majority of even the more-conciliatory KMT supporters ac-
tually still would not prefer even peaceful reunification.)
China considers Taiwan a Bcore interest,^ but accepting that
claim at face value means endorsing both ethnic essentialism
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and the recently-spun fiction of a long- united China only
seeking to reclaim its territory: it blatantly disregards both
historical reality and the wishes of the majority of liberal-
democratic Taiwan’s 23 million people.
Furthermore, lack of formal diplomatic recognition and the
international rights and privileges therein actually does enor-
mous harm. China’s interference ranges from petty (e.g., forcing
suspension of the Kimberley Process, an intergovernmental
meeting on stemming Bblood diamond^ trade, until Taiwanese
observers were ejected, or threatening punishment against inter-
national airlines that list Taiwan separately) to debilitating (e.g.,
limiting economic development by pressuring other countries to
not sign trade agreements with Taiwan, persuading countries
such as Spain andKenya to extradite suspected Taiwanese crim-
inals to China instead) to downright dangerous (e.g., Bone-
China^ excludes Taiwan from membership in international or-
ganizations, so the WHO knowingly jeopardized millions of
lives during the 2003 SARS epidemic by refusing to share vital
information or cooperate with or send assistance to Taiwan until
it received Chinese permission, which came only after SARS
had already spread rapidly.)
Yet the international community turns a blind eye, instead
strategically currying favor with the larger economy and great-
er military power. While the U.S. Congress’s Taiwan
Relations Act formally agrees to sell arms to Taiwan for de-
fensive purposes, it is ambiguous about the nature of its re-
quirement to defend Taiwan in the event of Chinese attack,
and the U.S. signals its ambivalence and pressures Taiwan into
not rocking the boat, by holding back on weapons sales and
visa privileges, for example.
The Self-Sabotage of Pursuing Stability
Accepting the Bone-China^ policy—and in effect China’s
claim over Taiwan—is problematic for at least two reasons.
First, all liberal-democratic societies acquiescing to this dam-
age their own domestic interests. While international sponsor-
ship of one’s domestic rights and values is not required in a
Westphalian-based system of sovereign states or in many the-
ories of political ethics, the strength of those domestic princi-
ples is called into questionwhen they are blatantly disregarded
by the same actors overseas. It is the burden of universalistic
theories to be held to a higher standard.
Second, the international community must encourage and
incentivize in China what has already happened in Taiwan—
but it is a grave mistake to think that it can do so by shunting
aside the very model of Confucian liberalism it wants to pro-
mote, and instead short-sightedly catering to illiberal and ag-
gressive Chinese demands.
Geopolitical interests in accessing China’s market and re-
sources as well as taming a potential adversary and preventing
war are crucial, but pursuing them this way will not incentivize
the CCP to cooperate, for it assumes that China’s intentions are
limited and that appeasement will work. There is little evidence
of the former. As for the latter, maintaining the status quo or
offering concessions in the form of a Bgrand bargain^ involving
Taiwan does the opposite, as the CCP already takes the interna-
tional community’s willingness to sacrifice its own values for
the sake of stability, Bharmony,^ and economic growth—which
happens to align with China’s stated mōrēs—as an indication
that there is no need to reform or cooperate, as it is already
getting what it wants by sheer dint of potential power.
An Elusive Kurdistan
On the other side of the world, the nation of Kurdistan, which
exists only in the imagination, is similarly situated. The dif-
ferences are obvious, as Taiwan is an established, if unrecog-
nized, country with defined boundaries, whereas Kurdistan—
semi-autonomous Kurdistan Region in Iraq notwithstand-
ing—is a collection of people spread across territories in
Turkey, Syria, Iraq, and Iran, and not politically organized or
unified to nearly the same extent. Nonetheless, there is a cru-
cial parallel: its tenuous situation within a larger hostile envi-
ronment, despite its greater alignment with American and in-
ternational political and social values.
The Kurds live among hardline regimes that promote ex-
treme interpretations of Islam largely indistinguishable from
that of ISIS in order to stay in power. (Countries do so differ-
ently: e.g., Saudi Arabia’s dominant religious sect and official
government ally is Wahhabism, whose beliefs are no more
enlightened than ISIS’s, all the way down to public
beheadings, executing Bwitches,^ and stoning adulterers.
Meanwhile, Syria’s secular nationalist Baathist regime has
an unofficial marriage of convenience with and likely pro-
vides arms to ISIS, to fan the flames of sectarianism on which
the government then cracks down, in order to justify its own
oppressive rule.)
In the midst of strongly patriarchal societies that legalize all
manner of restrictions on women’s movement, education,
marriage, and access to services, afford them few rights to
property or their own bodies even in cases of horrific abuse,
and turn a blind eye to honor killings and rapes, one of the
most notable Kurdish innovations is gender egalitarianism.
The pro-Kurdish H.D.P. party in Turkey decrees that men in
polygamous marriages or who had been convicted of abuse
cannot run for office or hold party positions, all parliamentary
tickets must be gender-balanced, Kurdish towns must have
male and female co-mayors, local government boards and
committees must include female co-executives, women must
be hired in new patronage and municipal jobs until there is
gender balance, decisions about women (handled by the
Women’s Affairs Department) must be made by women,
wives can receive monetary compensation from abusive
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husbands, and guerrilla units must be fully gender-integrated,
including their command positions. Similar protections exist
in other Kurdish-governed areas.
Yet, even in officially—but increasingly tenuously—secu-
lar Turkey, this progressive incarnation of Muslim society is
under assault, with its leaders jailed on political grounds, and
the H.D.P.’s sister party P.K.K. banned and deemed a terrorist
organization by Turkey, the U.S., and Europe. Kurdish society
is far from perfect—many struggle with gender equality pri-
vately and in practice, and there are problems with corrup-
tion—but it is a more liberal and tolerant form of Islam, and
a beacon in an otherwise bleak and violent ocean.
Despite a brief flirtation with the idea of a Kurdistan
region after the Ottoman Empire’s collapse and the
existing Kurdish Autonomous Region in Iraq (which
on 26 September 2017 voted overwhelmingly in a ref-
erendum in favor of independence, in the face of con-
certed opposition from the United Nations, U.S.,
Turkey, Iraq, and Iran, and military threats by some of
those neighbors), much of Kurdish history has been of
rebellions, uprisings, and violent repression, and with
little serious movement toward a greater independent
Kurdistan.
Meanwhile, Kurds occupy the frontlines of several wars
against more oppressive regimes (including the 1991 Gulf
War, the ongoing Syrian civil war, and the fight against
ISIS) as sacrificial pawns: sent into the fray, but when they
win too many battles and advance too far forward, those os-
tensibly on the same side but opposed to an independent
Kurdistan (e.g., Turkey, Syria, Russia, etc.) turn to attack the
Kurds instead, as they prefer oppressive and murderous
Islamists to progressive ones that might ultimately threaten
their own rule.
While the U.S. provides material and military support to
the Kurds, including some combat troops, it is insufficient and
largely behind-the-scenes, because the U.S. needs access to
Incirlik AB and other regional facilities from Turkey, a fellow
NATO member. Separately, the U.S. continues to tout its alli-
ance with hardline theocracy Saudi Arabia, for example, while
the international community also perpetuates Saudi Arabia’s
good standing—sometimes in farcical ways, such as with its
appointment to the United Nations’ Commission on the Status
of Women.
This causes similar long-term problems as the lack of
endorsement for Taiwan. There should be no equivocation
about American and international backing for a moderate
Muslim society: this ambivalence only undermines their
own values, and further promotes the very type of Islam
that they are fighting against. As such, the Kurds are stuck
in a comparable place: a people with values rare in their
region and who should be arduously promoted, but is in-
stead exploited in favor of alliances with larger authoritar-
ian and/or religious-extremist regimes.
Possible Room for Maneuver
In both cases, liberal democratic citizens of all political lean-
ings should advocate formal independence for both Taiwan
and Kurdistan. It is a radical position—but the correct one—
and they should promote this even as they recognize that it is
an unlikely outcome.
What is more likely, and what American foreign
policymakers should push for is more autonomous regions
for the Kurdish populations in their respective territories and
greater formal integration of Taiwan into the international
community. While adversaries should not be provoked into
aggressive retaliation, there is more room for maneuver than
is exercised.
It is commonly thought that the U.S. has no choice in both
matters, but in fact, it has more leverage than widely believed:
Turkey needs U.S. military support against its regional adver-
saries, Saudi Arabia’s economy is dangerously dependent on a
single natural resource on which the world is becoming de-
creasingly reliant, and while China is treated as if it were
already the world’s largest economy and most powerful mili-
tary, it is in reality only prospectively so and is facing a mul-
titude of potentially-destabilizing economic, political, and so-
cial problems along the way. Combined with an untested mil-
itary (which last fought in 1979, to dubious success) and an
unpredictable North Korea on its border, China wants a war
even less than the U.S. does.
Once the international community abandons the illusion
that liberal-democratic Confucianism can be found in a
CCP-ruled China and that progressive and moderate forms
of Islam will emerge in Saudi Arabia or Turkey under its
current governance, it can recognize that greater support for
Taiwan and Kurdistan not only aligns with its norms but also
promotes its longer-term strategic interests.
What that backing would entail requires a more thorough-
going policy discussion, but there is substantial space between
appeasement and starting a war, and the U.S. should be ex-
ploring possible Bgrey zone^ activity: gradual, incremental,
and subtle series of actions, each of which alone would not
warrant an adversarial response, but when taken together sig-
nificantly alter the geopolitical landscape. This strategy has
been skillfully employed by China in building its artificial
islands in the South China Sea and by Russia in occupying
parts of Ukraine.
Developing a comparable response to counter such aggres-
sions and promote the interests of those the U.S. should be
championing is a necessary policy discussion that follows
from the realization that these greater powers will not moder-
ate themselves, with or without prodding.
In both cases, the American government should do more
than these peoples themselves can ask for—such as official
Track 1 discussions with Taiwan, selling it more arms, issuing
more forceful statements about American protection for
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Taiwan as a fellow liberal democracy, including Taiwan’s rep-
resentatives in summits of various kinds—because of the na-
ture of the international backlash, such as to the Sept. 2017
independence referendum in Iraqi Kurdistan. (The recent
Taiwan Travel Act, unanimously passed by both houses of
the U.S. Congress and signed by the president, for example,
is a positive development, but it is only as significant or sym-
bolic as its usage, and must be employed in conjunction with
an array of diplomatic, economic, and military tools that slow-
ly erode China’s coercive monopolization of Blegitimate^
governance across the Taiwan Strait.) Such actions would
speak volumes to the international community in shoring up
Taiwan’s international position. They would incur China’s
wrath, but—taking a page from China’s playbook in the
South China Sea—each individual action would not be so
egregious as to provoke a violent reaction, and would eventu-
ally add up to a dramatic change in the status quo.
That the Kurds’ and Taiwan’s progressive models of soci-
ety are thriving in regions hostile to their way of life is testa-
ment to their robustness and importance—far easier for them
to simply succumb to the stronger powers. Their values are
aligned with America’s own and their spread will help bring
long-term security. The current strategy of standing aside
while China dictates the fate of Taiwan and the region and
permitting major Middle Eastern players to alternately exploit
and strike the Kurds only promotes the very values and inter-
ests that are dangerous to the world.
It is thus in American society’s and international in-
terest to stop using Taiwan and the Kurds as surrogates,
pawns, and bargaining chips, while offering nothing
more than surreptitious or insincere gestures of support.
There will be short-term trade-offs, of course, and it is
not without significant risk: but especially given how
unreliable China, Saudi Arabia, and other dictatorships
have already proven themselves to be (e.g., in dealing
with crucial security issues such as North Korea and
ISIS), the international community must more openly,
publicly, and forcefully champion and defend its liberal
and progressive allies with more creative regional tactics,
for the sake of its own values and strategic interests as
much as for theirs.
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